and highest third of prices). Note that the lowest tier displayed the highest returns over this period, while the highest tier displayed the lowest returns.
The widespread availability of subprime and other alternative mortgage products during this period, while arguably increasing consumption levels and homeownership rates, has been broadly blamed for these outcomes. The combined share of subprime and alternative mortgage products peaked at 34.8% of all mortgages originated during the first quarter of 2006, roughly coincident with the peak in the housing market (Inside Mortgage Finance [2007] ).
In this paper we empirically investigate the claim that increased credit availability in the subprime sector drove the housing boom against four alternative explanations for the current dynamic that have been, or could be, offered: (1) economic fundamentals (e.g., employment, income, population 
Literature Review
The literature on house price dynamics is voluminous, so our review here is necessarily limited.
Focusing on the measurement of house price movements, Shiller (1987, 1989) develop the repeat sales methodology, now widely viewed as the best available method for assessing house price movement over time. 8 Case and Shiller find considerable momentum in house price changes; however, transaction costs make profitable trading strategies difficult. Since 2006, a futures product based upon the Case-Shiller Index has been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange 9 . Similar, though not identical, indices for all metropolitan statistical areas are publicly available from the Office of Federal
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO), with technical details about development of the index available in Calhoun (1996) . One issue with the OFHEO index is that some of the data points used for 6 The Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund Ltd. and the Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Master Fund Ltd. filed for protection under Chapter 15 of the bankruptcy code, according to court documents.
7 Indirect or wholesale channels include loans sourced through brokers or correspondent lending relationships and are generally viewed as riskier than retail loan originations.
index estimation are based on mortgage loan refinancing transactions in which an appraisal, rather than an arm's length sale, establishes the property's value at a point in time, although recently OFHEO has made available a sale-only index. Another issue has to do with the fact that the OFHEO index is made up only of Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac loans, hence is a biased sample of the market. Capozza, Hendershott, and Mack (2004) summarize the literature on house price forecasting models. They contend that there is wide consensus that employment and population growth cause rents and prices to increase. They also argue that there is further consensus that prices should increase with income and move inversely with the level of interest rates or, more broadly, the cost of capital.
Turning to the recent literature on the housing bubble, Case and Shiller (2003) begin by noting that the term "bubble" is widely used but rarely precisely defined. They argue that the term refers to a situation in which widespread expectations of future price increases cause prices to be temporarily elevated. In turn, the expectation of large price increases may have a strong impact on demand if households believe that home prices are very unlikely to fall, and certainly not likely to fall for long, so that there is little risk associated with a home purchase. They note, too, that the mere presence of rapid price increases is not in itself conclusive evidence of a bubble, since economic fundamentals may explain much of the observed increase. They argue that income growth alone explains the pattern of recent home price increases in most states and falling interest rates explain much of the recent run-up nationally. Likewise, McCarthy and Peach (2004) argue that the recent upturn in homes prices is largely attributable to strong market fundamentals, in particular, the growth of income and the decline in interest rates. Himmelberg, Mayer, and Sinai (2005) also focus on the ability of economic fundamentals to explain recent house price patterns, constructing measures of the annual cost of single-family housing for 46 metropolitan areas in the United States over the period 1995-2004 and comparing those costs to the cost of renting. They argue that metrics such as the growth rate of house prices, the price-to-rent ratio, and the price-to-income ratio fail to account both for the time series pattern of real long-term interest rates and predictable differences in the long-run growth rates of house prices across local markets. They find that from the trough of 1995 to 2004, the cost of owning rose somewhat relative to the cost of renting, but not, in most cities, to levels implying that houses were overvalued.
Pavlov and Wachter, in a series of papers (2004, 2006a, 2006b) , develop and test models that examine the implications of aggressive non-recourse asset-based lending that under-price default risk.
They demonstrate expectations of greater asset price volatility and deeper asset price "crashes" following negative demand shocks. The causes are relaxed income constraints (on the up side) freeing up latent demand for home ownership and (on the down side) the decline in the availability of aggressive lending activities following the demand shock. Empirical tests make use of international data and data from Los Angeles to provide evidence of under-pricing of default risk on the upside, coupled with over-valuation of assets, along with more extreme declines afterward.
More recently, Mian and Sufi (2008) make use of micro-level data at the Zip Code level to examine the dynamic of freeing latent demand through the offering of aggressive lending vehicles, which they found was intimately bound up with the immediate sale of such loans into securities. They attribute increases in house prices followed by sharp subsequent rises in default and rapid house price declines in high latent-demand neighborhoods to the moral hazard facing originators selling into such conduits.
Another strand of the literature focuses on supply constraints. Glaeser, Gyourko, and Saks (2005) focus on regulatory constraints affecting the elasticity of housing supply. They argue that a declining supply elasticity resulting from increased local development regulations in certain cities has caused prices to rise excessively in recent years. These arguments are consistent with Malpezzi (1996 and Malpezzi and Maclennan [2001] ), that cross-sectional variation in regulatory constraints helps explain variation in house price dynamics through its effect on supply elasticity. Shiller (2007) , however, notes that the recent run-up in house prices has occurred, not just in the U.S., but also in Australia, Canada, China, France, India, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Russia, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The coincidence of housing booms across countries would seem to cast doubt on the argument that purely local phenomena, such as supply constraints caused by regulation, could be primarily responsible for house price growth patterns. 10 Moreover, Shiller argues, the boom in the U.S.
may be best understood as a series of regional booms, starting at different times. Shiller characterizes the boom in home prices since the late 1990s as a classic speculative bubble, driven mainly by extravagant expectations for future price increases, and argues that survey research measuring the extent to which consumer expectations of house price expectations are inflated confirms this description.
Most recently, in a paper most closely related to our work, Wheaton and Nechayev (2007) The literature on mortgage lending is likewise extensive, so we merely note briefly important earlier and more recent research addressing related topics. Early literature addressed the demand for mortgage debt (Jones [1993] , Brueckner [1994] ) and the demand for alternative mortgage products, such as those allowing variable interest rates (Brueckner and Follain [1988] ). More recent patterns in the mortgage market as revealed by Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data , in particular the rapid growth of non-prime lending, the increased volume of lending on properties that are not owneroccupied, and the increasing use of simultaneous-close second liens (also called "piggybacks"), have been described by Avery, Brevoort, and Canner (2007) . The GAO has reported to Congress on the growth of non-traditional mortgage products (GAO [2006] ), and regulatory bodies have set forth guidance on risks and best practices for financial institutions engaged in such lending (FFIEC [2006 (FFIEC [ , 2007 detailed discussion of the rise of subprime lending, its role in increasing home ownership rates among traditionally under-served households, and the risks associated with this development.
Methodology and Model Specification
We are interested in a simple model for home prices that explicitly allows for changes in loan type intensities to be a leading indicator of future home prices. Starting with a structural model with both supply and demand relationships: 
where t n, π are reduced-form impact multipliers.
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Our priors are that the predominant effect of increased density of a particular alternative loan type intended to increase homeownership would affect prices and returns positively (i.e., t n, π > 0), primarily through the demand effect. 13 But, there could also be negative influences operating in the short-and longer-run on prices and returns. We recognize that lags of only a year's duration are insufficient to reveal fully the most important possible future adverse impacts of subprime loans and other novel mortgage arrangements on the HPI. To the extent that the most important adverse impacts on house prices are revealed primarily through subsequent delinquency and default experience, such events typically take place over a longer period of time, peaking 3 to 4 years after origination, before declining again. Thus, our observation period would be too short to provide much data on such an extended lag effect. However, we note there are other near-term effects that could also cause reduced house price returns. The first of these is a supply effect in which builders may supply additional units to the market based on lower capital costs. A second is the possibility of loose, or even fraudulent, underwriting, leading to higher "early" defaults. Such a pattern has characterized the most recent cohorts of non-conforming mortgage products. 14 Finally, "flipping" of properties within a year by investors/ redevelopment contractors could increase the supply of homes on the market, thus driving down returns.
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Data
We combine data from a number of sources to construct our pooled cross-sectional time series, which includes 20 metropolitan areas for 36 quarters, 1998-2006. Our main housing market variables relate to lending activity and home prices. We obtain HMDA data for home purchase loans, both to owner-occupants and non-owner occupants, for calendar years 1998-2006. HMDA data, generally thought to be the most complete census of lending activity in the U.S., is used to construct the denominator in many of our measures of lending activity. From First American Loan Performance we obtain counts of private-market ABS home purchase loans by type, including Alt-A, BC (subprime),
and Jumbo loans, as well as non-owner occupant (investor) loans (which could be any of the above types). We then define loan type densities for Alt-A, BC, Jumbo MBS, and non-owner occupant by dividing loan originations for each type by total HMDA originations. Hence, subprime density represents the percentage of total loan originations accounted for by subprime mortgages. Because of the lack of MSA-specific LTV information in the MIRS data, we made use of LTV information from Loan Performance, which provides the distribution of reported LTV's at origination by metro area for each quarter of the observation period. The average LTV across MSA's and over time from this data source was also remarkably stable, consistent with the MIRS data. Under the hypothesis that it is really the density of high-ratio loans, rather than the average LTV, that is most relevant as an explanatory factor for encouraging increased housing demand, we derived from LP a variable representing the proportion of purchase originations that had LTV's over 90% ( Figure 5) .
Surprisingly, this variable does not increase as house prices begin rising in 2000. In fact, it drops significantly from around 37% of all loans made to about 12% by Q1 2006, when it again begins to rise, consistent with dropping house prices. This anomaly is possibly explained by the increased use of "piggy-back" second liens and "80-10-10" financing to substitute for PMI or simply draw equity out during over the observation period. 17 Unfortunately, a consistent data base that includes all sources of borrowing and total LTV at origination by source does not exist for individual MSA's and all originations over the observation period. Thus, we must merely note that the effect of our Percent of Mortgage Originations over 90% LTV variable may not be an adequate proxy for high-ratio lending.
For our final loan-related variable, from the Federal Housing Finance Board, we use the MIRS data to obtain the national average conventional mortgage rate each quarter. Together, these loanrelated variables imply we have more extensive and complete measures of mortgage lending activity than have most previous studies, in particular that of W-N.
For our housing price index, we use the Case-Shiller Index for all 20 large metropolitan areas that are readily available over our observation period, both for the total market as well as by tiers representing the top, middle, and bottom third of prices in each market (Figures 1 and 2 ). For the purpose of comparison with the results of W-N, we also obtain the OFHEO index for each of the quarters in our observation period. Note that although W-N use the OFHEO index, with its problems as noted above, this nonetheless enables them to enlarge their sample size to 59 metropolitan markets. We attempt to replicate our estimation results using the OFHEO index, but found the noise from OFHEO's appraisal-based valuations, as discussed above, significantly inflated our standard errors.
Previous researchers have pointed out the need integrate housing supply dynamics in house pricing models. To address the supply side of the housing market we use the Wharton Residential Land
Use Regulation Index (WRLURI) of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) . WRLURI captures a recent snapshot of residential housing supply-side restraints specific to over 2,600 localities and major metropolitan areas. This corrects another limitation of the W-N analysis. Although the measure is cross-sectional only and does not vary over the observation period, we consider this a minor issue,
given the relatively short length of the observation period and our expectation that the vast bulk of variation in land use regulatory stringency would exist cross sectionally. For demographic and macroeconomic controls with metropolitan area granularity, we use population, per-capita income, and the unemployment rate. Population and income data come from Bureau of Economic Analysis, while unemployment data comes from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
In addition to cross-sectional controls, we include time series of the following economic and financial metrics from the aggregate US economy: all US Treasury rates, major stock indices, CPI for urban consumers, total non-farm mortgages outstanding, and GDP. Along with the effective mortgage rate (as measured by the Federal Housing Finance Board), we use the yield curve slope (10 year notes divided by 2 year notes) as measures of the cost of capital for home buyers. In addition to controlling for inflation, the CPI also functions as a basic proxy for the cost to supply housing. Table 1 provides summary statistics for all of the data elements in our analysis. All loan count variables represent the number of loans originated in a quarter. The 20 metropolitan areas in our sample represent nearly 103 million people as of the end of 2006, over a third of the total U.S.
Summary Statistics
population. Table 2 shows dramatic increases in subprime lending intensity over our observation period, compared to relatively modest increases in income and even more modest changes in population. Table 3 ranks our 20 MSAs by the percentage of loan originations that are subprime as of the fourth quarter of 2006. Note that Los Angeles, Las Vegas, and Phoenix, which had some of the most dramatic increases in home prices, all rank high in subprime intensity. However, this observed correlation does not control for the numerous other factors potentially influencing house price changes, so we cannot draw definitive conclusions from this relationship. Note for example, the high correlation between the intensity of subprime lending and both non-owner occupied lending and MSA per-capita income.
Finally, Table 4 displays the pairwise correlations for all area-specific data in our analysis.
Note that the highest individual correlation with quarterly house price returns is by the non-owner occupied loan origination density, but the level of correlation is not high (0.218). The land use regulatory index (WRLURI) display the second highest correlation (0.157). The economic fundamentals variables (population, unemployment, and per capita income) individually are not highly correlated with house price returns, but that does not suggest that together they might be. We note particularly that none of the other private ABS mortgage density variables, beyond non-owner occupied loans, provide any significant degree of correlation with house price returns. during periods of higher unemployment, and private ABS issues tend to be most used in higher income MSA's (which also tend to be larger), contradicting the common notion that they are primarily concentrated in lower-income areas. The fact that the regulatory index is also highly correlated with income is consistent with the findings of Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) that strict land use controls are the product of wealthy jurisdictions.
Results
Pre-testing shows our model is accurately characterized as an AR (1) process. Looking at correlograms for price levels in our main reduced form model, we find very strong serial correlation with a pattern characterized by first degree autocorrelation. When we take quarterly changes in home prices, autocorrelation is still quite persistent. Finally, when we take quarterly returns in home prices, we find lower but non-negligible indications of autocorrelation (and a very mild degree of second order autocorrelation). Table 5 shows the correlograms and initial Durbin-Watson statistics of our main specification for price levels, changes and returns. These initial tests suggest that the housing market exhibits return momentum, not just price momentum, but that this momentum mostly occurs within a year.
We use an iterative EGLS approach to address autocorrelation in housing price index returns as well as possible simultaneous trends between prices and independent variables during our sample period. The Prais-Winsten estimates of ρ in the AR(1) error structure confirm the presence of autocorrelation in returns found in the pre-testing (Table 5) . While the momentum in returns indicates that including lagged returns as an explanatory variable would help predict future returns, including a lagged endogenous variable would make our Prais-Winsten estimates of ρ in the AR(1) error structure inconsistent. One possible solution would be to use lags of the macroeconomic variables to create an instrumental variable for lagged prices. We already control for macroeconomic variables contemporaneously and we want to be able to pick up any predictive power the proportions of loan type, especially subprime intensities, may have-whether it comes from interaction with macroeconomic phenomena or has a direct relationship with home prices.
Since we are interested in testing if subprime lending intensity has predictive power of any economic significance, we focus on the sign and magnitude of the impact multipliers in the reducedform results to measure economic significance. Because of heterogeneity in local demographics and economics, it is possible that impact multipliers will vary across cities. Since the urban economic literature agrees on the directional relationship between home prices and macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, population, and income, we pool our data across cities to measure the reducedform model on the national level. We assume that any variance between cities not captured by population, income, unemployment, or residential land use regulation will not cause variation in the direction prices move with respect to various loan type densities.
We estimated four separate sets of specifications for our single-equation reduced-form model described above. In order to properly handle the presence of an AR(1) error structure, we used the Prais-Winsten method to estimate ρ, then undertook OLS on the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation. We clustered by MSA and used heteroskedastic-robust t-statistics. Note that all R 2 estimates need to be untransformed from the Cochrane-Orcutt transformation to get absolute measures of goodness of fit.
But they can be used, as is, for comparing models. In comparing Models 1a -1d, we found that Model 1a, which used HPI returns as the dependent variable, generally did the best job of correcting for serial correlation (lowest ρ value), hence having the most reliable (i.e., least inflated) t-statistics, however Model 1b also had a slightly higher R 2 .
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Model 1d, which used the OFHEO index, had the worst fit, likely due to the noise in the data from appraised value transactions under refinancing. We thus confine our discussion to the results from Model 1a, found in Table 6 . 19 To examine the possibility that the impact of subprime density could be concentrated differentially at the low end of the market, we ran model 1a both for the aggregate CS index and the CS index stratified into price terciles.
First, with respect to the impact of the loan-type mix, we found that the Jumbo Prime density had a significant cyclic relationship with future home prices. In the short run (6 months or less) more
Jumbos were associated with lower index returns. But a year out, an increase in the Jumbo proportion of loans increased returns. The economic magnitude of this effect was moderate: A 1% increase in proportion of Jumbos correlated with a -0.18% (-.0018) quarterly return in the aggregate HPI after six months, but a +0.25% increase after a year. This cyclic effect appears to be more extreme in the higher-price ranges. On the other hand, the percent of loans that were Alt-A had a significant positive contemporary relationship with home prices (+0.13%), offset by a negative marginally-significant relationship with home prices a year later (-0.08%). This effect was strongest in the mid-price tier.
These results suggest that Alt-A and Jumbos have opposite temporal cycles with respect to their relationship between quarterly returns and home prices, though similar in magnitude.
The non-owner occupied mortgage market was found similar in pattern, though significantly greater in magnitude, to the alt-A market. The percent of loans that were non-owner occupied had a significant positive relationship with home prices over 0-6 months (peaking at +0.32% (+.0032) after 3 months in the aggregate model). But over 9-12 months this relationship reversed and there was a 18 W-N also found superiority in the model specification using price index returns.
19 Results for the other models are available from the authors.
significant negative effect of a similar magnitude (-0.27% after 12 months). These effects were of comparable magnitude across all price tiers. Thus, while contemporaneously and in the short run the non--owner occupied home buyers bid up home prices, they had a significant negative effect over the longer run that tended to offset it. The extent to which this pattern may have had anything to do with any intent to "flip" properties after a year is unclear.
Significantly, we found in Model 1a (and virtually always throughout our analysis) the percent of originated loans that were subprime had virtually no statistical significance on future home prices over any interval or price tier, and even the point estimates were small in economic terms. The only partial exception is a small (+0.04 to +0.06%) and barely significant positive contemporaneous effect that persists across price tiers. This finding runs contrary to the hypothesis that subprime lending per se was largely responsible for the run-up in the HPI ending in 2006. Since non-owner occupant loans could be either subprime, Jumbo, or Alt-A, subprime could be still operating interactively through the investor loans, but there is little significant evidence of a direct effect, even in the lowest price tier. The percent of mortgages of at least 90% LTV at origination did not seem to be significantly associated with house price changes across any of the price tiers, although as noted above, this result could be confounded by the possible expansion of mezzanine "piggyback" loans, which would reduce LTV for the first lien position, but may increase it overall.
With respect to our macro-and MSA-specific economic variables, we found a negative and significant coefficient (with the exception of the highest price tier) on the S&P 500. This could be an indication that over our sample period real estate was used as a safety vehicle by investors, especially during the major decline in equities that started in 2000 when investors sought to take their wealth out of stocks and put it in real assets, namely real estate (although one would have expected this effect to be greatest at the high end of the market). A sizeable proportion of this flow of funds was likely done through non-owner occupancy purchasing. This suggests the possibility that in an equity upturn these same investors would be willing and able (assuming real estate illiquidity did not hinder them) to quickly reverse their flow of funds back to the stock market and out of real estate.
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Model 1a indicates that population growth and the unemployment rate were the main macroeconomic variables driving home prices. Surprisingly, interest rates were not found to have a significant relationship with home prices. Over our sample period the Fed raised, lowed and raised again the Fed Funds rate but house prices had a single increasing trend until 2006Q3. The negative significant coefficient on aggregate home mortgage debt outstanding, especially at the high end of the market, is interesting and unexpected unless one believes increased credit could represent an "oversupply" of credit, shifting the housing supply curve outward and downward and reducing prices.
Finally, we observe that the supply constraint index (WRLURI) is correctly positively signed and significant at the 10 percent level (other specifications showed higher significance). The significance is greater and the magnitude of the coefficient higher at the high end of the market, as expected. Perhaps if we had better data -a time series version that permitted individual MSA variations over time -it is possible that supply constraints would have been shown to have had a more significant positive impact on prices, although the likelihood that land use regulatory restrictiveness is persistent over time within individual MSA's is high.
Model 2: GSE-to-private ABS regime shift
As shown in Table 7 and Figure 6 , Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae exhibited two different regimes of behavior during our observation period. Until 2003Q3, they were active issuers and purchasers of conventional conforming MBS securities (regime I). However, after this time, they stepped back considerably (regime II).
This retrenchment can be hypothesized to be a result of several factors. First is the fact that they were experiencing considerable political problems in Washington. Accounting irregularities resulted in pressure that ultimately led to the resignation of their senior officers. Ongoing assertions of lack of safety and soundness caused by lack of proper hedging mechanisms and being "too big," resulted, in their weakened political state, in pledges to reduce the growth of their portfolios. Their retained loan portfolio was capped. Since 2006 until very recently, their maximum lending limit for single-family loans remained at $417,000 in the face of continuing increases in house prices nationwide, resulting in their being able to purchase increasingly fewer loans (although this was not a binding constraint for most of our observation period The significant withdrawal of the GSEs from the conventional conforming market is shown in Table 7 and Figure 4 to have led to a significant substitution effect, in which the private ABS and . 24 At the same time, the GSE share dropped from an average of 54% of the market in the 1998-2003 period to under 7% in2004-05. 25 A natural question of concern is the extent to which such a regime change had on the housing market, and specifically house prices.
behalf of banks and other private financial institutions as their being ably suited to take on Freddie and Fannie's role without the "implicit government subsidy" created by their implicit Federal government guarantee on their debt. See Thomas (2003) for a concise statement of the Republican issues with respect to the continued dominance of the GSE's.
Our results for the two regime periods -1998Q1 to 2003Q3 and 2003Q4 to 2006Q4 -are shown in Models 2a and 2b ( In regime I, before the GSE pullback, we see that most of the macroeconomic fundaments, including the unemployment rate and income variables, are significant and of the correct sign. This model has the lowest estimated value for ρ of all the models, i.e. demonstrating the least autocorrelation, possibly an indication of a market that was not raising demand based on past increases in prices (not a "bubble" market). In regime II, however, the macroeconomic fundamentals (income and unemployment) lost their significance. Other factors were driving HPI returns. This model had the highest estimated value of ρ, suggesting that regime II exhibited the highest degree of momentum in housing returns, a "bubble" characteristic.
During regime I, the Jumbo MBS, Alt-A, and Non-owner occupied loan percentages have basically the same pattern of results as in model 1a, though generally at somewhat lower significance levels. However, for the first time, we see sub-prime BC loans as being statistically significant in quarters 2 and 3, though with a sudden shift in sign from a decrease in the HPI return of -0.19% for every percentage point increase in the density of Subprime loan originations six months in the future, followed by an increase of +0.17% 9 months in the future. The contemporaneous effect on prices is also positive and marginally significant at +0.18%. Although this saw-tooth pattern is unexplained, it suggests some modest direct impact of subprime during regime I when the GSE's were still active.
The impact of the lending variables appears to diminish considerably during regime II, with the exception of the non-owner occupied loan density, which increases the magnitude and significance of its first-positive, then-negative effect on returns. The only other loan type whose density seems to show significant impact on returns is a contemporaneous positive effect (+0.23%) by Alt-A mortgages.
We note that the modest prior indication of significance of the density of subprime lending on house price returns during regime I disappears entirely during regime II.
We note finally one other variable that displayed a highly significant impact during regime II but not during regime I, when the GSE's were still active. The steepness of the yield curve (ratio of 10-year to 2-year Treasury yields to maturity) displays a coefficient of -3.75, implying the flattening of the yield curve after the Fed began raising rates in 2004 had a strong accelerating effect on house prices.
This would normally be expected to dampen demand by borrowers seeking low-rate ARM loans, but instead we saw a substantial increase in loan volume after the Fed's actions to raise rates. This could be interpreted as a "rush to the exit" by borrowers seeking to beat future increases, but perhaps a more defensible explanation is on the supply side: ABS lenders had a great hunger for yield, which drove both the softening of underwriting standards and the creation of new "teaser rate" ARM's or other mortgage products (such as "2-28's") that could provide greater initial access to credit to previously marginal borrowers, but higher expected yields going forward. This effect more than offset the increased short-term rate effect, especially since the long rate remained relatively constant over the period, which served as the primary basis for cap rate formation in the housing market.
In other words, if the I-banks and hedge funds had a hunger for spread during this period of a flat yield curve, then their demand could have been fueling subprime and other alternative mortgage activity. MBS spreads general tightened over this period, indicating increased demand from the highfinance community. Our primary conclusion to be drawn from the dominant GSE-vs. dominant private-ABS-regimes is that the primary driver of house price returns during the GSE-dominant years tended to be economic fundamentals, with some indication of short-term, largely offsetting effects from jumbos, subprime, and non-owner occupied investor loans. However, in the ABS-dominant years, with one exception, the loan-density related effects largely disappeared, as did the effects of economic fundamentals. Non-owner occupied loans and the hunger for yields by private ABS issuers exploiting the dynamics of the yield curve (while ex post found to be underpricing risk) drove house price returns to new highs, which did not abate until 2006. Subprime lending activity per se was not the primary culprit in driving house prices higher. Rather both were the products of an economic environment and permissive regulatory environment that allowed the house price market dynamic to play out.
Testing for Robustness
A number of additional model specifications were estimated as a robustness test to ascertain the extent to which our results as stated above may be associated with specific relationships that might modify our interpretations. Specifically, we tested for four separate possible hypotheses: The impacts of loan densities across instruments upon Case-Shiller House Price Returns (CS HPR's) are mediated by (1) local and temporal economic fundamentals; (2) the magnitude of subprime penetration at the peak of the housing bubble (in quintiles); (3) the magnitude of house price returns over the observation period (in quintiles) ; and (4) the interaction between the magnitude of subprime penetration (lowest vs.
highest) and the house price tier (lowest vs. highest). These estimations are intended to evaluate the extent to which the impact of lending activity density may vary across certain clusters of MSA's. We note below the significant finds from this exercise; full estimation results are available from the authors.
First, we consider the interaction effects with economic fundamentals. We ask whether subprime lending concentration, found to be insignificant in our base model, can become important in certain low-growth (or high-growth) MSA's. Subprime insignificance persists, however, across all economic interaction specifications. The strong significance we found of non-owner occupied lending activity on house price returns for the most part disappears with consideration of the economic interaction terms, suggesting a consistent effect across MSA's of all economic conditions. Jumbo loan activity, however, displays both direct and interaction effects with economic fundamentals.
With respect to interaction with the degree of subprime penetration, insignificance was again persistent across all quintiles, in particular the quintile representing the highest degree of subprime density. Non-owner occupied lending activity, however, did appear to become more economically and statistically significant in the higher quintiles of subprime lending. This again reinforces the robustness of our previous results -the importance of non-owner occupied lending and lack of importance of subprime lending per se in affecting house price returns.
With respect to interaction with the level of "hotness" (i.e., appreciation) of the MSA housing market, we find the density of subprime lending has no effect in the lowest three quintiles, but a negative effect in months 9-12 in the fourth quintile and a positive effect in the highest quintile ("hottest") markets. Further examining the 5 th quintile, we find that subprime's effect is strongest among the highest-end homes (third price tier). The coefficient is highly significant and of high economic importance: a 10% increase in subprime density leads to a 2.4 percent increase in quarterly return after a year (roughly double). This result is counterintuitive, as one would have expected subprime credit availability to have driven up lower-priced homes in less "hot" markets, but it seems that the effect was primarily felt in the already "hot" markets and at the higher end of the housing stock.
We note parenthetically that there is some evidence supporting possible "flipping" effects among those using non-owner occupied loans, as the initial gains created by subprime availability are entirely reversed out over a year.
Finally, with respect to interaction with both house price tier (lowest vs. highest) and degree of subprime penetration n (lowest vs. highest), we find that subprime lending is most influential among the lowest-priced homes where there is the least subprime concentration. The coefficient is highly significant and of high economic importance; an increase of 10% in subprime concentration increases house price quarterly returns by 3.1% (over double) over a year.
Overall, we find that our previous results are relatively robust, but that subprime lending density can make a greater positive difference in returns at the margin among the lowest price homes if the level of such lending is low to begin with. Otherwise subprime lending has little direct effect on low-end house price returns. Non-owner occupied lending activity, however, remains important in driving returns, especially so in areas where subprime lending activity is already high.
Conclusions and policy implications:
Our analysis, though closely related to that of Wheaton and Nebchayev (W-N, 2007) in purpose, differs from theirs in important respects. Whereas their observation period extended to only 2005, we were able to incorporate information through 2006, thus capturing at least he beginning of the "bubble burst". Our analysis was also a pooled, cross-sectional analysis of MSAs; we did not run separate MSA analyses to evaluate the effects of the economic fundamentals variables, then a separate analysis on the 2005 forecast errors to get at the effects of lending and other non-fundamental variables. We made use of the Case-Shiller House Price Index (HPI), rather than the OFHEO Index, which we found introduced considerable noise, likely due to OFHEO's inclusion of appraisal-based value estimates from the inclusion of refinancings. We also had available information from Loan Performance, which provided loan origination information over time by MSA by loan type, whereas W-N had to use proxies for subprime loan originations and were not able to consider such other loan types as Jumbos, ARMs, or Alt-As. Finally, we were able to include certain supply, as well as demand-side variables, which they did not consider, specifically a proxy for residential construction costs and a land use regulatory index.
Our results confirm certain of the findings of W-N with respect to the influence of fundamental economic factors on house price dynamics during the run-up of the early 2000's. Specifically, we found that the size of the MSA, population growth, employment (unemployment rates in our models), and per capita incomes drive house prices in the expected directions, at least in the early years of our observation period, through 2003. In addition, we confirm their findings with respect to certain lending-related factors that were present during the observation period: specifically, our non-owner occupied loan origination intensity variable, corresponding roughly with their variable for second or investment home loans, was found to be significant
In certain other respects, however, we found evidence contrary to or unavailable in W-N's initial findings. A negative and sometimes significant coefficient with the S&P500 Index provided some evidence of the influence of capital flows from sectors considered "weaker" to those considered "stronger" over the cycle. Surprisingly mortgage interest rates were not found to have a significant relationship with house prices when other factors were taken into account. As expected, the construction cost index for housing, proxied in this study by the CPI index, was found to positively influence house prices, as was the other supply variable, the Wharton Land Use Regulatory Index (WRLURI). We were not, however, successful in finding an effect of higher LTV's, used as a proxy for "looser" lending standards (comparable to W-N's LTI variable), on house prices, as they were able to do using the LTI variable.
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Some of our most interesting results derived from our availability of the Loan Performance data, which provided a detailed breakdown of loan originations by type. These results suggested that the pattern of contemporaneous and lagged effects of different loan-type originations on house prices was complex, and varied both by loan type and lag-length. The percent of Jumbo and alt-A loans both had significant cyclical relationships with house price returns, though in different directions. Jumbos were associated with initially lower price index returns (6 months or less) but the effect turned positive and significant after a year. Alt-A loans behaved in an opposite fashion: contemporaneously and within a short period they were associated with an increase in house prices, a relationship which turned negative after a year. In both cases, the effects are relatively small to moderate in magnitude.
The non-owner occupied loan market, which we already indicated coincided with W-N's finding of significance of investor loans in affecting house price returns, displayed a similar relationship to that of the Alt-A market, with a positive relationship up to 3 months out, dropping to a negative relationship of comparable magnitude after 12 months. The magnitudes of the effects were significantly higher than those in the Jumbo and Alt-A markets. Significantly, and contrary to the conclusions of W-N, we found very little evidence of an increased concentration of subprime lending per se having any significant impact on contemporaneous or later house price index returns. These results are seemingly in contrast to Pavlov and Wachter (2004 , 2006a , 2006b ) if we confine our consideration to the subprime sector alone. But considering the entire set of private ABS loans (including in particular non-owner occupied and Alt-A loan origination densities) suggests that loanorigination density effects taken together were still found to be associated with higher house price returns.
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The most important and heretofore unrecognized impact of lending patterns on subsequent house price returns was found to originate with the regime-shift which occurred in late 2003, with the considerable pullback of the GSE's from the market, both for political, regulatory, and economic reasons. The resulting reshuffling of supply of mortgage capital in the market, resulted in both a record increase in total lending volume after 2003 and a substantial substitution of alternative private instruments for conventional conforming GSE loans. This was particularly true of the Alt-A, subprime, and non-owner occupied investor products. We find that the dominance of economic fundamentals and other market characteristics in driving house price returns to be more significant in the earlier years, before the GSE pullback. After the pullback, not only were economic fundamentals less important, the measures of autocorrelation present in our model estimates suggested this period possessed the highest degree of momentum in house prices -a "bubble" characteristic.
The dominant policy conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of this paper is that the existence of subprime loan products alone may not merit primary blame for the problems currently being experienced in the housing and mortgage markets. Rather, political and regulatory actions and economic conditions --which led to a disruption in traditional flows of credit into the market and permitted not only new instrument designs, but also weaker underwriting standards, to flow in great volumes into the void -may be deemed complicit, if not dominant in precipitating the subsequent series of adverse events. Subprime intensity is calculated as the number of subprime loans originated divided by the total number of HMDA loans originated.
Sources: Loan Performance, HMDA, Bureau of Economic Analysis 1998Q1-2006Q4 . Subprime origination intensity is calculated as the number of subprime loans originated divided by the total number of HMDA loans originated. Non-owner occupied origination intensity is calculated similarly. WRLURI is a cross-sectional variable that is static through time. Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) find that higher land use regulation is associated with a higher income area. This is confirmed in our Case-Shiller Metropolitan area sample.
Source: Loan Performance; HMDA; Bureau of Economic Analysis; S&P Case-Shiller Home Price Index; Gyourko, Saiz, and Summers (2007) ; Bureau of Labor Statistics Percent of Quarterly Flow can be negative or greater than 100% because institutions may sell or buy home mortgages from each other in addition to buying newly originated home mortgages 
